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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
CONFLICT OF LAWS-LAw GOVERNING CONTRACT-CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW.
-The-plaintiff had a fidelity bond with the defendant upon its officers and
employees. The contract was entered into in Memphis, Tennessee. Plain-
tiff's office was removed from Memphis to Scott, Mississippi, where the defal-
cations of the treasurer occurred. The plaintiff sued upon the bond in Missis-
sippi. The bond provided that claim must be made within fifteen months after
the termination of the suretyship for the defaulting employee. The contract
covering the treasurer ended December 31, 1929, and the plaintiff did not
make a claim until June 22, 1931. The Tennessee law enforces such a pro-
vision as a limitation of liability and not a limitation of action. Under the
Mississippi law the action is limited and must yield to the statute prescribing
a six-year period. Sec. 2294, Miss. Code of 1930 provides: "All contracts
of insurance on property, lives or interests in this state shall be deemed to be
made therein." The plaintiff's recovery under this statute was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Mississippi. (150 So. 205) Held: Reversed on the
ground that the statute was applied extraterritorially and consequently the
defendant was denied due process of law. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (1934) 54 S. Ct. 634.
What law should be applied to a contract is a question of great uncer-
tainty. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws
(1921) 30 Yale L. J. 565, 655; 31 Yale L. J. 53. It is generally said that
there are three rules by which to determine the essential validity of a con-
tract: lex loci contractus, Carnegie v. Morrison (1841) 2 Mete. (Mass.) 381,
the law of the place of performance, Miller v. Tiffany (1863) 1 Wall. 298;
Robinson v. Bland (1760) 2 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717; Story, Conflicts
(8th ed., 1883) sec. 280; the intention of the parties, Pritchard v. Norton
(1882) 102 U. S. 124. See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927) 218, 228; Beale,
What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (1909) 23 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
79, 194, 260. In the instant case the Court concluded that both the place of
making and of performance were in Tennessee. Although the particular
result is sound, it is possible to criticize it on the ground that it will enable
contracting parties too easily to avoid the state law by crossing the border
and executing the contractual formalities in another state. Perhaps a more
suitable theory could be worked out upon the basis of the situs of the inter-
est; this could certainly prevent conscious evasion of state law although it
would vest much discretion in the courts.
The more fundamental significance of the principal case involves the re-
lation of conflict of laws with constitutional law. See Ross, Has the Conflict
of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law? (1931) 15 Minn. L. Rev.
161. Although the Supreme Court has said, in Kryger v. Wilson (1916) 242
U. S. 171, that the application of a rule of conflicts is a matter of purely local
concern, other cases do not bear this out. Insurance cases have been the ones
in which the Court has most easily assumed jurisdiction of a question of con-
flicts. It is said that no state can exercise any extraterritorial authority
because of constitutional inhibitions. Pennoyer v. Neff (1878) 95 U. S. 714;
see Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 165 U. S. 578. Statutory expressions of
local policy toward insurance have been invalidated because of conflict with
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the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U. S. 357; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken (1924) 266
U. S. 389; see Comment (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 826. The Court also men-
tioned impairment of the obligation of contract and the full faith and credit
clause in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head (1914) 234 U. S. 149. The com-
merce clause was applied to nullify a telegraph mental anguish statute in
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown (1914) 234 U. S. 542. But see Fox v. Postal
Tel. Cable Co. (1909) 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399, where Wisconsin law
was applied in a suit for the negligent transmission of a telegram from New
York to Chicago. The application of the due process clause is probably pref-
erable in that it is less restrictive upon the courts. The chief value in bring-
ing such cases into the federal courts would be uniformity of conflict rules.
See Note (1930) 40 Yale L. J. 291. After all, uniformity, rather than the
intrinsic superiority of any particular rule, is the real aim of conflict of laws.
N. P., '34.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY-COMPOUNDING FELON.-Plaintiff Insurance Co.
seeks to recover $81,014.36, part of the amount paid to the Defendant Bank
under a robbery insurance contract. In the contract there was a stipula-
tion that in case of recovery of the stolen items from any source other than
insurance or security the net amount, less the actual cost of making the re-
covery, should be applied to reimburse the insured in full for the loss, and
the excess, if any, should be paid to the insurer. Part of the stolen items
were recovered as a result of negotiations with the criminals on the part of
both the Insurance Co. and the Bank, whereby the robbers received $140,000.
The lower Court refused to allow the Insurance Co. a recovery on the grounds
that the contract whereby the items were recovered from the robbers, was
void as against public policy and R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 3894, Fidelity and De-
posit Co. v. Grand National Bank of St. Louis (D. C. 8, 1933) 2 F. Supp. 666
---commented upon in 18 St. Louis Law Rev. 352. The bank's counterclaim
based on the expenditure of the ransom money in obtaining the return of the
stolen bonds was also held invalid.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision on the
grounds that, the ransom contract being completed, and the recovery being
based solely upon the insurance contract stipulation, no taint of invalidity
from the ransom contract existed which would prevent the Insurance Co.'s
recovery on the Insurance contract. Fidelity and Deposit Co. V. Grand Na-
tional Bank of St. Louis (C. C. A. 8, 1934) 69 Fed. (2d) 177. In the light of
the provision in the insurance contract (supra) and the well established
principle of law that an action is maintainable as long as the illegal trans-
action is not required to establish the cause of action, Brooks V. Martin (1864)
2 Wall. 70; Thompson v. Lyons (1920) 281 Mo. 430, 220 S. W. 942, it seems
that the conclusion reached by the Appellate Court is sound. The substan-
tiating dicta, however, to the effect that the ransom contract itself is not in-
valid as against public policy in that there is no express or implied agree-
ment to suppress, stifle or stay criminal prosecution as part of the considera-
tion appears to be of doubtful application in the present case.
It is settled principle in American jurisprudence that a civil action may be
maintained against a thief to recover stolen property or its value before
prosecution. Downs v. Baltimore (1910) 111 Md. 674,76 Atl. 861, 41 L. R. A.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol19/iss4/12
